By Prof. Zhang Fei'an and Ph.D. student Zhang Shi'an, Renmin University of China
The success of Chinese-style modernization practice also provides a crucial theoretical opportunity for driving a paradigm shift in modernization studies. Distinct in historical starting points and practical characteristics from the society-centered path represented by Britain and the United States and the state-centered path represented by Germany and Japan, party-centeredness is not only a specific experience of modernization in China and Russia but also a relatively universal path in the modernization process of various countries. The difference lies only in the strength of the party's role as a modernizer, depending on the starting point of modernization. The later a country begins its modernization, the more the party needs to act as an organizer and promoter, and the more evident the party-centered modernization path becomes.
Classical Western modernization theory refers to the first generation of modernization theory, matured during the Cold War and led by the United States, which sought to regulate the modernization paths of developing countries through theoretical construction in order to prevent them from imitating the Soviet model. This classical theory was a product of "Cold War social science," deeply embedded with political power, and suffers from two major blind spots: First, during its construction, the organizational dimension of the modernization process—a feature shared by both Western and communist countries—was deliberately excluded as historical experience. Second, because organizational capacity was an institutional advantage of communist countries, not only were organizational elements in the modernization process ignored, but organizations themselves were demonized.
Due to these blind spots, the society-centered development path of classical modernization theory is inevitably falsified by the modernization practices of developing countries. Beginning with Huntington's “Political Order in Changing Societies” and continuing with Skocpol's “States and Social Revolutions,” the second generation of modernization theory gradually embarked on a path of "bringing the state back in," subsequently giving rise to the "developmental state" theory based on the modernization experiences of Japan and the Four Asian Tigers. "Bringing the state back in" became the basic consensus of second-generation modernization theory.
However, second-generation, state-centered modernization theory has a notable questionable point: Who organizes the state? If "bringing the state back in" was the first revision of Western modernization theory, then "finding the party" can be considered the second revision—and one that is originally Chinese, carrying paradigm-shifting significance for modernization theory. This should be a focal point in China's international discourse, providing justification and historical proof for the party's leadership in the modernization process.
History has already shown that the history of modernization is a history of increasing state organization. The later a country starts its modernization, the more disadvantageous the conditions it faces, requiring stronger development motivation and more effective strategies, which must be accomplished through stronger organizational means. Modern states are all party-states; political parties are the most effective organizers of modern states. Possessing a strong, development-oriented political party is an indispensable factor for any country to achieve modernization. The initial success of the Chinese Communist Party in leading Chinese-style modernization provides a favorable opportunity to rethink the driving mechanisms of modernization beyond Western modernization theory. Guided by the President Xi’s call to accelerate the construction of an independent knowledge system for Chinese philosophy and social sciences, the Chinese academic community must strengthen its historical consciousness in constructing a universal theory of modernization, push modernization studies out of the paradigmatic confines of Western liberal discourse, complete the transition from the old paradigm to the new, and provide a more solid and broader theoretical foundation for the practical legitimacy of Chinese-style modernization.
Published on April 30, 2026