In his article in “Modern Law Science” Issue 1, 2024, Song Weizhi states that despite the rapid development of digital jurisprudence and academic enthusiasm, the field’s theoretical underpinnings, particularly the foundational premises, remain underdeveloped.
Firstly, digital jurisprudence exhibits certain theoretical ambiguities. The issues it addresses are predominantly technological and can often be addressed through refinements to the current legal theory framework. Secondly, the field’s theoretical scaffolding is not robust; it has not yet transcended traditional power theory frameworks nor introduced a theory that surpasses technological limitations. Consequently, digital jurisprudence falls short of substantiation in both its problem domain and theoretical architecture. It may be more precise to characterize digital jurisprudence not as a novel paradigm in legal studies but as a broad categorization of technological applications. Within the realm of legal theory, digital jurisprudence does not constitute a legitimate academic proposition.